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SUMMARY 
The B-52 SAS ( S t a b i l i t y  Augmentation System) was developed and r e t r o f i t t e d  
t o  nea r ly  300 a i r c r a f t .  It actively c o n t r o l s  B-52 s t r u c t u r a l  bending, provides  
improved yaw and p i t c h  damping through senso r s  and e l e c t r o n i c  c o n t r o l  channels ,  
and p u t s  complete r e l i a n c e  on h y d r a u l i c  c o n t r o l  power f o r  rudder  and e l e v a t o r s .  
The system has  now experienced over  300,000 f l i g h t  hours  and has  exh ib i t ed  ser- 
v i c e  r e l i a b i l i t y  comparable t o  t h e  r e s u l t s  of  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t  program. 
Development exper ience  p o i n t s  o u t  numerous l e s sons  wi th  p o t e n t i a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  
the  mechanization and development o f  advanced technology c o n t r o l  systems of h igh  
r e l i a b i l i t y .  
INTRODUCTION ! 
The B-52 SAS ( S t a b i l i t y  Augmentation System) w a s  developed and r e t r o f i t t e d  
on n e a r l y  300 a i r c r a f t  i n  o r d e r  t o  ach ieve  t h e  fo l lowing  ob jec t ives :  
a. Minimize f a t i g u e  damage due t o  s t r u c t u r e  d e f l e c t i o n  i n  turbulence .  
b. Improve c a p a b i l i t y  of wi ths tanding  extremely h igh  v e l o c i t y  g u s t s .  
c. Improve yaw and p i t c h  damping 
d .  Inc rease  rudder  and e l e v a t o r  a u t h o r i t y .  
e. Improve crew r i d e .  ' 
It  w a s  necessary t o  p l a c e  unusual  emphasis on system r e l i a b i l i t y ,  f o r  two 
p r i n c i p a l  reasons:  
a .  On t h e  yaw and p i t c h  axes ,  replacement of  t h e  o r i g i n a l  mechanical 
( se rvo  tab)  s y s t e m  by a hydrau l i c  a c t u a t o r  system in t roduces  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of t o t a l  l o s s  of rudder and e l e v a t o r  c o n t r o l  i n  f l i g h t  due 
t o  hydrau l i c  f a i l u r e s .  
b ,  The use of an e l e c t r o n i c  system w i t h  r e l a t i v e l y  high rudder  and e l e v a t o r  
a u t h o r i t y  in t roduces  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of sudden unscheduled displacements  
o r  "hardovers" of t h e  c o n t r o l  s u r f a c e s  due t o  e l e c t r i c a l  f a u l t s ,  w i t h  




Figure  1 i s  a s i m p l i f i e d  schematic  diagram of t h e  SAS. Yaw damping and 
e l a s t i c  mode suppress ion  s i g n a l s  are genera ted  by combining rate gyro ou tpu t s  
wi th  la teral  acce lerometer  o u t p u t s ,  and t h e  ga ins  are scheduled accord ing  t o  air- 
speed (h igh  ga in  a t  low a i r s p e e d  and vice v e r s a ) .  For t h e  p i t c h  a x i s ,  on ly  rate 
gyro s i g n a l s  are used; t h e  g a i n  i s  f i x e d  and independent of a i r speed .  There a r e  
two e s s e n t i a l l y  independent h y d r a u l i c  power s u p p l i e s ,  each having a main pump and 
an emergency pump. The main pumps are e l e c t r i c a l l y  powered; t h e  emergency pumps 
a r e  simply h y d r a u l i c  t ransformers  (motor-pump packages),  d r iven  by s e p a r a t e  
e x i s t i n g  u t i l i t y  hydrau l i c  systems and provided wi th  flow l imiters t o  avoid 
c r ipp l - ing  t h e  u t i l i t y  systems i n  t h e  event  of l o s s  of f l u i d  from a SAS system. 
The c o n t r o l  s u r f a c e  a c t u a t o r s  are  of tandem type ,  normally powered by both 
hydrau l i c  supp l i e s .  
T h e  system i s  b a s i c a l l y  FO-FS ( f a i l  o p e r a t i o n a l  on f i r s t  f a i l u r e ,  f a i l  s o f t  
on second) ,  w i th  t h e  fo l lowing  except ions :  
a .  I f  two l a t e r a l  acce lerometer  channels  f a i l ,  a l l  t h r e e  acce lerometer  
channels  drop o u t ,  wh i l e  t h e  yaw a x i s  cont inues  t o  o p e r a t e  on t h e  yaw 
rate  gyro s i g n a l s  on ly .  
b. I f  two g a i n  schedul ing  channels  f a i l ,  a l l  t h r e e  channels  r e v e r t  t o  a l o w  
g a i n  t h a t  i s  s a f e  a t  a l l  a i r speeds .  
These two f e a t u r e s  provide a s u b s t a n t i a l  decrease  i n  t h e  number of two-fa i lure  
combinations t h a t  can cause yaw a x i s  disengagement o r  l o s s  of func t ion .  
The b a s i c  redundancy management concept  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s t r a igh t fo rward .  A t  
va r ious  p o i n t s  i n  t h e  three-channel s enso r -e l ec t ron ic s  subsystem, v o t e r s  and 
comparators a r e  used,  as shown on Figure  2 .  For example, t h e  t h r e e  i n p u t s  a t  t h e  
l e f t  of t he  diagram may r e p r e s e n t  t h r e e  r a t e  gyro ou tpu t s ,  w h i l e  t h e  t h r e e  out-  
p u t s  a t  t h e  r i g h t  may r e p r e s e n t  t h r e e  channels  of an  e l e c t r o n i c  c o n t r o l  u n i t .  
I f  any i n p u t  d i s a g r e e s  w i t h  t h e  median s i g n a l  by more than t h e  p r e s e l e c t e d  e r r o r  
t h re sho ld ,  t h e  comparator t r i p s  and l a t c h e s  i t s e l f  i n  t he  t r i p p e d  mode. I n  t h i s  
mode, t h e  comparator swamps t h e  d i s c r e p a n t  i n p u t  so t h a t  i t  w i l l  no t  be s e l e c t e d  
by any v o t e r  as a median s i g n a l .  
over ;  i n  o t h e r  cases, i t  is  a 400 Hz square  wave. Also,  t h e  comparator s h u t s  o f f  
i t s  normal "O.K." s i g n a l  t o  t h e  l o g i c  c i r c u i t r y ,  t hus  prepar ing  t h e  l o g i c  t o  t a k e  
proper a c t i o n  i n  t h e  event  of a subsequent second f a i l u r e .  On t h e  yaw a x i s ,  t h e  
f a i l u r e  of one channel  a l s o  sends a "channel f a i l e d "  s i g n a l  t o  t h e  p i l o t ,  warning 
him t h a t  redundancy has  been l o s t  and t h a t  yaw damping w i l l  be au tomat i ca l ly  
disengaged i n  t h e  event  of  a second s i m i l a r  f a i l u r e .  Loss of yaw damping i s  n o t  
a h ighly  c r i t i c a l  f a i l u r e  mode, bu t  i t  poses  a s l i g h t  t h r e a t  t o  f l i g h t  s a f e t y  by 
r e q u i r i n g  manual damping of Dutch ro1.1, which may be  d i f f i c u l t  wi th  c e r t a i n  ad- 
v e r s e  combinations of h igh  g r o s s  weight ,  h igh  a l t i t u d e ,  poor v i s i b i l i t y ,  and 
turbulence.  No such warning t o  t h e  p i l o t  i s  r equ i r ed  f o r  s i n g l e  channel  f a i l u r e s  
i n  acce lerometer ,  g a i n  schedul ing ,  o r  p i t c h  a x i s  channels ,  as t h e s e  pose no 
t h r e a t  t o  f l i g h t  s a f e t y  and r e q u i r e  no special  crew a c t i o n .  
I n  some cases t h e  swamping s i g n a l  i s  a hard- 
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FLIGHT SAFETY RELIABILITY 
I n  e a r l y  d i scuss ions ,  A i r  Force r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  expressed a c lear  d e s i r e  t o  
s ta te  t h e  system r e l i a b i l i t y  o b j e c t i v e  i n  terms of  a i r c r a f t  l o s s  ra te .  Th i s  
r equ i r ed  a n a l y s i s  i n  cons iderably  g r e a t e r  depth  than  o rd ina ry  r e l i a b i l i t y  calcu-  
l a t i o n s  
a. 
b. 
C .  
d .  
f o r  a redundant system. It w a s  necessary  to :  
Define each p o t e n t i a l l y  c r i t i ca l  f a i l u r e  mode of t h e  system i n  t e r m s  of 
t h e  e f f e c t  on c o n t r o l  s u r f a c e  motions.  
Compute t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of  occurrence s e p a r a t e l y  f o r  each of t h e s e  
modes du r ing  each phase of  a s tandard ized  mission p r o f i l e .  
Compute t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  a i r c r a f t  l o s s  f o r  each mode i n  a v a r i e t y  of 
f l i g h t  cond i t ions  ( a l t i t u d e ,  a i r s p e e d ,  and presence of nearby a i r c r a f t  
such as i n  aerial  r e f u e l i n g )  w i t h  proper  allowance f o r  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of 
v a r i o u s  turbulence  i n t e n s i t i e s  and v i s i b i l i t y  cond i t ions .  
Combine t h e  above t o  o b t a i n  a t o t a l  p red ic t ed  B-52 l o s s  rate a t t r i b u -  
t a b l e  t o  SAS f a i l u r e .  
CRITICALITIES 
During t h e  p ro to type  program, hundreds of SAS f a i l u r e s  w e r e  s imulated i n  
p i l o t e d  f l i g h t  s imula to r s  and t h e  r e s u l t i n g  a i r c r a f t  motions w e r e  recorded .  Five 
o r  more d i f f e r e n t  p i l o t s  were used f o r  each combination of SAS f a i l u r e  mode and 
f l i g h t  cond i t ion .  
percentage of SAC p i l o t s  t h a t  would have been unable  t o  avoid l o s s  of t h e  air- 
c r a f t .  
each combination. These r e s u l t s  were combined w i t h  the  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of given 
turbulence  cond i t ions ,  v i s i b i l i t y  cond i t ions ,  and a u t o p i l o t  s t a t u s  t o  y i e l d  a 
c r i t i c a l i t y  ma t r ix  s u i t a b l e  f o r  u se  i n  t h e  a i r c r a f t  l o s s  p r e d i c t i o n  program. 
C r i t i c a l i t y ,  as used he re ,  is  def ined  as t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of a i r c r a f t  l o s s  - i f  t h e  
given system f a i l u r e  mode occurs  du r ing  given f l i g h t  cond i t ions .  
A f t e r  each s imula t ion ,  t h e  p i l o t  w a s  asked t o  estimate t h e  
The r e s u l t s  were averaged t o  a r r i v e  a t  a p r o b a b i l i t y  of a i r c r a f t  l o s s  f o r  
I n  t h e  p a s t ,  t h e r e  has  been a widespread tendency to  treat c r i t i c a l i t y  as a 
To l a b e l  a f a i l u r e  mode as "crit ical" meant t h a t  i t  would i n v a r i a b l y  dichotomy. 
cause l o s s  of t h e  a i r c r a f t ,  and t o  l a b e l  i t  as "non-cr i t ica l"  meant t h a t  i t  
would never  cause l o s s  of a i r c r a f t .  I n  o t h e r  words, c r i t i c a l i t y  w a s  ass igned  
only  two p o s s i b l e  va lues :  ze ro  and 100 percent .  It i s  t r u e ,  of course ,  t h a t  many 
f a i l u r e  modes have c r i t i c a l i t i e s  of zero ,  and some f a i l u r e  modes, such as g ross  
f a i l u r e  of  a primary s t r u c t u r e ,  have c r i t i c a l i t i e s  of 100 pe rcen t .  But i n  any 
a t tempt  t o  make a r e a l i s t i c  p r e d i c t i o n  of t h e  f l i g h t  s a f e t y  r e l i a b i l i t y  of a 
c o n t r o l  s y s t e m ,  i t  must be recognized t h a t  many of  t h e  f a i l u r e  modes w i l l  have 
i n t e r m e d i a t e  c r i t i ca l i t i es .  They may approach 100 pe rcen t  w i t h  unfavorable  
combinations of f l i g h t  cond i t ions ,  and may be  e s s e n t i a l l y  ze ro  wi th  f avorab le  
combinations of f l i g h t  cond i t ions .  
_ _  
The p r o b a b i l i t y  of occurrence of each p o t e n t i a l l y  c r i t i c a l  system f a i l u r e  
mode dur ing  each phase of t h e  miss ion  w a s  computed us ing  convent iona l  methods, 
but'wifh- c e r t a i n  re f inements  as subsequent ly  d iscussed .  These p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of 
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occurrence  were compiled i n t o  a f a i l u r e  mode occurrence  p r o b a b i l i t y  mat r ix .  
F igure  3 is  a s i m p l i f i e d  diagram showing t h e  p r i n c i p a l  f a c t o r s  e n t e r i n g  i n t o  the 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  of t h e s e  two matrices. The two matrices are cons t ruc t ed  and 
combined i n  a computer program t o  p r e d i c t  a i r c r a f t  l o s s e s .  
I n  many cases i t  w a s  found t h a t  t h e  c r i t i c a l i t y  of  a given system f a i l u r e  
mode w a s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  determined by t h e  mission phase o r  f l i g h t  cond i t ions  i n  
which t h e  f a i l u r e  occurred ,  bu t  by subsequent cond i t ions .  Many f a i l u r e  modes 
are r e l a t i v e l y  n o n c r i t i c a l  i n  h igh  a l t i t u d e  c r u i s e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  b u t  leave t h e  
s y s t e m  i.n a degraded s ta te  t h a t  may have a much g r e a t e r  c r i t i c a l i t y  i n  subsequent  
mission phases such as low l e v e l  p e n e t r a t i o n  o r  landing .  S ince  h igh  a l t i t u d e  
c r u i s e  accounts  f o r  a l a r g e  p o r t i o n  of  t h e  miss ion  d u r a t i o n ,  most of t h e  f a i l u r e s  
w i l l  tend t o  occur  du r ing  c r u i s e ,  b u t  many of  t he  r e s u l t i n g  a i r c r a f t  l o s s e s  w i l l  
occur  ciuring a subsequent  miss ion  phase.  For o t h e r  f a i l u r e  modes, t h e  s u r p r i s e  
f a c t o r  i s  predominant; t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of a i r c r a f t  l o s s  i s  c h i e f l y  dependent on 
t h e  p i l o t ' s  s k i l l  and c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  immediately a f t e r  t h e  f a i l u r e .  
cons ide ra t ions  were taken  i n t o  account  i n  t h e  computerized program. 
These 
BITE 
The system i n c l u d e s  BITE (Bui l t - In  T e s t  Equipment) which s e r v e s  two main 
purposes:  
a. I t  p e r m i t s  a quick  p r e f l i g h t  checkout t o  determine,  as f a r  as 
p r a c t i c a b l e ,  t h a t  a l l  components i n  a l l  channels  are u n f a i l e d  be fo re  
takeoff  . 
b. It f a c i l i t a t e s  d i agnos i s  by i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  f a i l e d  LRU. 
Nei ther  of t h e  above BITE func t ions  is  achieved wi th  100 pe rcen t  c e r t a i n t y .  
A c a r e f u l  a n a l y s i s  w a s  made t o  determine which f a i l u r e  modes of which components 
could n o t  be  de t ec t ed  by BITE o r  by any f e a s i b l e  p r e f l i g h t  check. For each such 
"hidden" f a i l u r e  mode, s u i  t a b l e  ground check i n t e r v a l s  w e r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  . 
eve r  a hidden mode, i n  combination wi th  o t h e r  component f a i l u r e  modes, could 
produce a p o t e n t i a l l y  c r i t i c a l  system f a i l u r e  mode, t he  computation of t h e  
p r o b a b i l i t y  of system f a i l u r e  mode occurrence  w a s  based on t h e  e s t a b l i s h e d  ground 
check i n t e r v a l  and n o t  merely t h e  t i m e  s i n c e  t a k e o f f .  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of a given two-fai lure  o r  t h r e e - f a i l u r e  combina- 
t i o n ,  as compared t o  t h e  convent iona l  method of computing redundant system 
r e l i a b i l i t y ,  which i s  based on t h e  i m p l i c i t  assumption t h a t  a l l  p a r t s  are 
u n f a i l e d  a t  t akeof f .  
Where- 
This  makes a s i g n i f i c a n t  
SNEAK FAILURE MODES 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h i s  "hidden" f a i l u r e  mode problem, w e  a l s o  encountered 
s e v e r a l  "sneak" f a i l u r e  modes. A sneak f a i l u r e  mode may be  roughly def ined  as 
one which produces unexpected e f f e c t s  t h a t  tend t o  nega te  p a r t  of t h e  redundancy. 
Such modes e x i s t  c h i e f l y  because of inadequate  FMEA ( F a i l u r e  Mode and E f f e c t  
Ana lys i s ) .  
sneak f a i l u r e  modes. I n  one of them, a s i n g l e  v o t e r  f a u l t  would produce a 
For example, t h e  v o t e r s  used i n  t h e  p r o t o t y p e  des ign  contained two 
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hardover s i g n a l  on a l l  t h r e e  channels  s imultaneously.  I n  t h e  o t h e r ,  a s i n g l e  
v o t e r  f a u l t  would cause a s i n g l e  hardover o r i g i n a t i n g  upstream t o  b e  propagated 
downstream on a l l  t h r e e  channels .  These problems were co r rec t ed  i n  t h e  produc- 
t i o n  des ign .  
Another f e r t i l e  f i e l d  i n  which sneak f a i l u r e  modes t y p i c a l l y  abound i s  i n  
t h e  a rea  of e l e c t r o n i c  module power s u p p l i e s .  Na tu ra l ly ,  t he  three-channel  
redundant c o n f i g u r a t i o n  of t he  e l e c t r o n i c s  and s e n s o r s  employed separate power 
supply modules t o  power the  e l e c t r o n i c s  on each channel .  Here aga in  sneak 
f a i l u r e  modes were found. 
d i s a b l e  a channel  and a t  t h e  same t i m e  p revent  t h e  l o g i c  c i r c u i t r y  from t a k i n g  
proper  a c t i o n .  
For example, one power supply module f a i l u r e  could 
Such modes were "designed out" wherever they appeared. : 
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECT ANALYSIS 
A s  might be  suspec ted  from t h e  above remarks,  t h e  t a s k  of  ana lyz ing  f a i l u r e  
modes and t h e i r  e f f e c t s  w a s  of paramount importance i n  making a real is t ic  f l i g h t  
s a f e t y  r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  f o r  t h e  SAS. The FMEA is  a t r a d i t i o n a l  t a s k  t h a t  i s  
usua l ly  c a l l e d  €o r  i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  programs, b u t  t h e  output ,  i n  many c a s e s ,  i s  of 
l i t t l e  va lue  i n  r e a l i s t i c  computation of t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  of a redundant system. 
Among the t y p i c a l  shortcomings are: 
a.  
b .  
C .  
d .  
e .  
Excessive e m p h a s i s  on what f a i l s  r a t h e r  than  - how i t  f a i l s ;  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
r ecogn i t ion  of f a i l u r e  modes o t h e r  than open c i r c u i t  and s h o r t  c i r c u i t .  
Inadequate  d e f i n i t i o n  of e f f e c t s  on t h e  system; use of ca t ch -a l l  phrases  
such as " l o s s  o r  deg rada t ion  of output";  phrases  such as 'ILoss of  +5 VDC 
power" wi thout  any a t tempt  t o  d e s c r i b e  what happens t o  the system when 
t h e  +5 VDC power i s  l o s t .  
Endless  r e p e t i t i o n  of t h e  obvious and n e g l e c t  of t h e  nonobvious. 
F a i l u r e  to  e x p l a i n  t h e  func t ion ing  of t h e  system o r  assembly and i t s  
components so  t h a t  t h e  FMEA w i l l  b e  meaningful t o  personnel  no t  h igh ly  
f a m i l i a r  w i t h  t h e  des ign .  
Inadequate  exp lana t ion  of redundancies ,  where a p p l i c a b l e ;  f a i l u r e  t o  
recognize t h a t  whi le  two assemblies  may be i n  p a r a l l e l  wi th  respect t o  
t h e  more common o r  obvious f a i l u r e  modes, they may be  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  
series w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  less obvious f a i l u r e  modes. 
AlthougJi formal FMEA r e p o r t s  a t  t h e  assembly l e v e l  were generated i n  t h e  
SAS r e l i a b i l i t y  program, t h e r e  w a s  no a t t e m p t  t o  compile a system-level  FMEA i n  
t h e  usua l  format which i s  no t  w e l l  s u i t e d  f o r  d e l i n e a t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
redundancies-. In s t ead ,  t h e  FMEA w a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  combined w i t h  t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
f l i g h t  s a f e t y  r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s  as  i l l u s t r a t e d  by Figures  4 and 5. These 
f i g u r e s  r e p r e s e n t  two of t h e  sys t em f a i l u r e  modes. The n o t a t i o n s  f 
r e p r e s e n t  hoa r ly  f a i l u r e  rates of t h e  va r ious  subassemblies  i n  t h e  a p p l i c a b l e  
subassembly f a i l u r e  modes. I n  o t h e r  words, they r e p r e s e n t  b locks  on a series- 
p a r a l l e l  block diagram o r  a f a u l t  t ree.  Each c r i t i c a l  system f a i l u r e  mode has  a 
etc.  49' f70 '  
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s e p a r a t e  diagram o r  a s e p a r a t e  branch on a f a u l t  t ree ,  w i t h  b l o c k s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  
o n l y  t h o s e  f a i l u r e  modes of subassembl ies  o r  components t h a t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  
g iven  c r i t i c a l  system f a i l u r e  mode. 
a p p l i c a b l e  mode f a i l u r e  ra tes  of  subassembl ies  i n  a n  o f f - l i n e  o r  s tandby s t a t u s .  
W r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  i c i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  would i n c a p a c i t a t e  a p i t o t  
head w i t h  a f a i l e d  h e a t e r .  The symbol H refers t o  f h e  300-hour p e r i o d i c  check 
for- p i t o t  system l e a k a g e ,  which is t h e  f a i l u r e  mode denoted by f81. 
n o t a t i o n s  T1 and T2 r e f e r  t o  t i m e  s i n c e  t a k e o f f ;  f o r  example, i f  a m i s s i o n  phase  
s t a r t s  5.52 h o u r s  a f t e r  t a k e o f f  and ends  7.52 h o u r s  a f t e r  t a k e o f f ,  TI = 5.52 and 
T2 = 7.52. I n s o f a r  as p o t e n t i a l l y  c r i t i c a l  modes a re  concerned,  t h e  FMEA is  t h u s  
r e p r e s e n t e d  by a c o l l e c t i o n  of c r i t i c a l  s y s t e m , f a i l u r e  mode f o r m u l a t i o n s  similar 
t o  F i g u r e s  4 and 5.  We have a t t e m p t e d  t h e  t a s k  of  modifying t h e  u s u a l  FMEA 
format t o  make i t  u s e f u l  i n  redundant  system a n a l y s i s ,  b u t  are n o t  s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  r e s u l t s  t o  d a t e .  
N o t a t i o n s  s u c h  as h 7 , ,  g67, e tc .  are t h e  
The 
Many component f a i l u r e  modes were s i m u l a t e d  i n  l a b o r a t 6 r y  tests, i n  o r d e r  to  
e v a l u a t e  f a i l u r e  mods e f f e c t s  t h a t  were n o t  c l e a r l y  p r e d i c t a b l e .  
BLOCK DIAGRAMS AND FAULT TREES 
S e r i e s - p a r a l l e l  bl-ock diagrams and f a u l t  trees are  sometimes thought  of 
t w o  d i f f e r e n t  t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  redundant  system r e l i a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s ,  a l t h o u g h  
when p r o p e r l y  used they  convey i d e n t i c a l  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The c h i e f  d i f f e r e n c e s  
between t h e s e  two approaches ,  as t r a d i t i o n a l l y  used ,  a r e :  
as 
a. Blocks on t h e  f a u l t  t ree  g e n e r a l l y  r e p r e s e n t  e v e n t s  o r  s p e c i f i c  f a i l u r e  
modes of components, w h i l e  b l o c k s  on t h e  s e r i e s - p a r a l l e l  diagram have 
sometimes been used t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  t o t a l  f a i l u r e  rates of  components. 
c 
b.  The f a u l t  tree is  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s t r u c t e d  beginning  a t  t h e  t o p  o r  system 
l e v e l  and working down t o  t h e  d e t a i l  o r  f u n c t i o n a l  module l e v e l ;  w i t h  
t h e  b l o c k  diagram, t h e r e  i s  a tendency to  s t a r t  a t  t h e  component 
l e v e l  and work up t o  t h e  system level .  
Ln t h e  B-52 SAS a n a l y s i s ,  w e  used two teams, one s t a r t i n g  a t  t h e  t o p  and working 
down, and t h e  o t h e r  s t a r t i n g  a t  t h e  bottom and working upward. Comparison of 
t h e  r e su l t s  provided  a u s e f u l  cross-check and he lped  t o  minimize %he chance of  
o v e r l o o k i n g  c r i t i c a l  combinat ions.  A s  l o n g  as t h e  b l o c k s  r e p r e s e n t  s p e c i f i c  
f a i l u r e  modes of t h e  modules o r  components, t h e r e  i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  
between t h e  two diagramming t e c h n i q u e s ,  and t h e  c h o i c e  between them i s  reduced 
t o  a mat%er of  p e r s o n a l  p r e f e r e n c e .  
RELIABILITY TESTS 
The r e l i a b i l i t y  programs € o r  b o t h  t h e  p r o t o t y p e  and p r o d u c t i o n  c o n t r a c t s  
i n c l u d e d  e x t e n s i v e  system r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t i n g  i n  g e n e r a l  accordance w i t h  
MLL-STD-781. O r d i n a r i l y ,  system r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t s  a r e  conducted p r i m a r i l y  f o r  
t h e  purpose of MTBF measurement o r  v e r i f i c a t i o n  of  compliance w i t h  MTBF 
requirements .  For t h e  SAS, t he  s y s t e m  t e s t s  were regarded p r i m a r i l y  as oppor- 
t u n i t i e s  f o r  f a i l u r e  cause a n a l y s i s  i n  o rde r  t h a t  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  could be  
i n i t i a t e d  a t  t h e  ear l ies t  p o s s i b l e  d a t e .  
t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  MTBF test w i l l  show an  MTBF of about  one t e n t h  of  t h e  p red ic t ed  
va lue .  
i n d i c a t e d  an MTBF of about  one f o u r t h  of t h e  p r e d i c t i o n ,  i n s t e a d  of one t en th . )  
Most of t he  f a i l u r e s  i n  the  MTBF tests, as  w e l l  as i n  t h e  f l i g h t  tes t  program 
and o p e r a t i o n a l  mockup ("Iron Bird") tests, showed clear causes i n  a c a r e f u l  
f a i l u r e  a n a l y s i s ,  and c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  were i n i t i a t e d  f o r  t h e  subsequent 
product ion  a r t i c l e s .  
I t  is almost  ax iomat ic  i n  t h e  i n d u s t r y  
(Maybe w e  were j u s t  lucky;  ou r  f i r s t  p ro to type  MTBF test on t h e  SAS 
MTBF t e s t i n g  under the  product ion  c o n t r a c t  w a s  d iv ided  i n t o  f o u r  phases: 
P h a s e  A cons i s t ed  of about  1800 hours of o p e r a t i o n  on an incomplete  s y s t e m  - 
p a r t l y  wi th  p ro to type  hardware and p a r t l y  w i t h  e a r l y  product ion (unquali-  
f i e d )  hardware. 
Phase B involved 2000 hours  of ope ra t ion  on e a r l y  product ion  hardware. 
P h a s e s  C and D involved 515 hours  each, u s ing  f u l l y  q u a l i f i e d  product ion  
hardware. 
The purposes  of Phases A and B w a s  t o  determine where r e l i a b i l i t y  improve- 
ments were needed, a t  t he  ear l ies t  p r a c t i c a b l e  d a t e .  The purpose of Phases C 
and D w a s  t o  demonstrate  a t t a inmen t  of t h e  requi red  MTBF. 
The r e l i a b i l i t y  test  environments,  both pro to type  and product ion,  included 
co ld  soaks and o p e r a t i o n  a t  ambient t e m p e r a t u r e s  up t o  71°C (160OF). I n i t i a l l y ,  
t he  p ro to type  test included pe r iods  of  appl ied  v i b r a t i o n  a t  33 Hz and 2g 
ampli tude.  V ib ra t ion  a t t e m p t s  w e r e  f i n a l l y  abandoned f o r  t he  fo l lowing  reasons :  
a. Th i s  Low frequency w a s  n o t  found t o  produce any s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  on 
equipment f a i l u r e  rates. 
b. This  type  of v i b r a t i o n  b e a r s  p r a c t i c a l l y  no r e l a t i o n  t o  t h e  v i b r a t i o n  
encountered i n  j e t  a i r c r a f t .  
c. Any s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c r e a s e  i n  frequency would r e q u i r e  a t o t a l l y  new test  
s e t u p .  The suppor t ing  j i g  w a s  marginal even a t  33 Hz. 
EFFECTS OF WEAROUT 
It i s  widely assumed t h a t  scheduled replacements  i n  s e r v i c e  w i l l  avoid t h e  
occurrence  of normal wearout f a i l u r e s .  MTBF is consequent ly  o f t e n  considered as 
a func t ion  of random f a i l u r e  rates only ;  and s i n c e  MTRF i s  cus tomar i ly  demon- 
s t r a t e d  by tests t h a t  t y p i c a l l y  o p e r a t e  each specimen f o r  500 hours  o r  less, 
normal wearout i s  seldom s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  MTBF demonstrat ions.  A s  a r e s u l t ,  w e  
s e e  so-ca l led  MTBF va lues  of 10,000 o r  even 50,000 hours  quoted f o r  mechanical 
and hydraul i c  equipment items, based only on t h e i r  "random" f a i l u r e  r a t e s  under 
the  assumption t h a t  scheduled replacement w i l l  avoid normal wearout problems. 
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NTBF i n  s e r v i c e ,  however, i s  a d i s t i n c t l y  d i f f e r e n t  problem. Scheduled 
replacements  a r e  seldom s p e c i f i e d  o r  p rac t i ced  except  where t h e r e  i s  a clear-cut 
s a f e t y  imp l i ca t ion .  A s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e  e f f e c t i v e  MTBF on such equipment i s  o f t e n  
f a r  less than  a pure  "random f a i l u r e "  cons ide ra t ion  would i n d i c a t e .  
SERVICE EXPERIENCE 
For t h i s  r eason ,  w e  kept  two sets of  books on the  SAS MTBF -- one s e t  
based on random f a i l u r e  rates only ,  and t h e  o t h e r  i nc lud ing  es t imated  normal 
wearout e f f e c t s .  Table  I shows t h e  r e s u l t i n g  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  p red ic t ed  s y s t e m  
MTBF, and a l s o  shows the  f a i l u r e  exper ience  i n  s e r v i c e  €or  ca lendar  y e a r s  1972 
and 1973. The fo l lowing  conclus ions  may be noted from t h i s  t a b l e :  
a .  The hydrau l i c s  subsystem shows a d i s t i n c t  rise i n  f a i l u r e  rates from 
1972 to  1973. The 1973 rates ag ree  c l o s e l y  w i t h  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  t h a t  
i nc ludes  wearout e f f e c t s .  
b .  The senso r -e l ec t ron ic s  subsystem shows a decrease  i n  f a i l u r e  ra tes  
from 1972 t o  1973, i n  s p i t e  of expected wearout e f f e c t s  i n  t h e  s i x  
gyros .  This  i n d i c a t e s  a mixture  of ' two d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of apparent  
i n f a n t  m o r t a l i t y  e f f e c t s :  
(1) The usua l  i n f a n t  m o r t a l i t y  experienced i n  e l e c t r o n i c  equipment, 
i n  s p i t e  of burn-in p r i o r  t o  d e l i v e r y .  
(2)  An improvement i n  t h e  maintenance o rgan iza t ions '  f a m i l i a r i t y  w i t h  
t h e  equipment, r e s u l t i n g  i n  b e t t e r  repairs  and fewer unnecessary 
replacements .  
c. F i e ld  exper ience  on t h e  system as a whole ag rees  c l o s e l y  wi th  t h e  
p r e d i c t i o n  t h a t  included es t imated  e f f e c t s  of normal wearout.  
The l a s t  two columns a t  t h e  r i g h t  of Table  I are based on d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  
of two f i e l d  da t a  samples which both  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  about one t h i r d  of t h e  
r epor t ed  e l ec t ron . i c  f a i l u r e s  might b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t r i a l - and-e r ro r  t rouble-  
shoot ing  o r  o t h e r  d i a g n o s t i c  e r r o r s .  This  s i t u a t i o n  i s  be l i eved  t o  be improv- 
ing  wi th  t i m e  and exper ience  gained i n  t h e  f i e l d .  
Table  I1 shows t h e  va r ious  types  of mission r e l i a b i l i t i e s  experienced i n  
s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  1972-1973 per iod .  There were no corresponding q u a n t i t a t i v e  
requirements  o r  p r e d i c t i o n s .  
Table  111 shows t h e  SAS f l i g h t  s a f e t y  r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements  and pre-  
d i c t i o n s .  
e f f e c t s .  There have been no l o s s e s  to d a t e  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  SAS. There 
w e r e  s e v e r a l  e a r l y  occas ions  of  l o s s  of one hydrau l i c  power supply i n  s e r v i c e ,  
due t o - f s t i g u e  f a i l u r e s  of main pump r i g i d  d i scha rge  l i n e s  which happened t o  b e  
i n  resonance wi th  t h e  pump p u l s a t i o n  frequency. A c t u a l l y ,  a s i m i l a r  f a i l u r e  
had previous ly  occurred i n  system r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t i n g ,  b u t  no importance was 
a t t ached  t o  i t ,  s i n c e  t h e  t es t  chamber space l i m i t a t i o n s  r equ i r ed  t h e  use  of 
The p r e d i c t i o n s  were c a l c u l a t e d  bo th  wi th  and wi thout  normal wearout 
plumbing conf igu ra t ions  somewhat d i f f e r e n t  from those  of t h e  a i r c r a f t .  The 
l e s son  l ea rned  from t h i s  exper ience  i s  t h a t  every e f f o r t  should be made t o  use  
a i r c r a f t  plumbing c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  i n  system r e l i a b i l i t y  tests, p a r t i c u l a r l y  where 
t h e r e  are conceivable  resonance o r  f a t i g u e  problems. 
The system MTBF tests i n d i c a t e d  s u r p r i s i n g l y  low r e l i a b i l i t y  f o r  c e r t a i n  
s imple widely used s t anda rd  o r  semistandard hydrau l i c  components such as accum- 
u l a t o r s  and p r e s s u r e  swi tches .  Although c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n s  were i n i t i a t e d ,  t h e .  
f i e l d  r e l i a b i l i t y  exper ience  on t h e s e  components is  s t i l l  d isappoin t ing .  
CONCLUDING REFARKS 
The nex t  few y e a r s  w i l l  see e x t e n s i v e  development of e l ec t ron ic -hydrau l i c  
f l i g h t  c o n t r o l  systems of fly-by-wire and controls-configured-vehicle  types ,  
performing h igh ly  e s s e n t i a l  f u n c t i o n s  and w i t h  extremely h igh  r e l i a b i l i t y  
requirements .  The B-52 SAS program has  provided u s e f u l  exper ience  f o r  t h e  
development of such systems, and has demonstrated t h e  need f o r  c l o s e  a t t e n t i o n  













Optimizat ion of  redundancy management. . 
Meaningful F a i l u r e  ModeIEffects ana lyses  wi th  p a r t i c u l a r  emphasis on 
e f f e c t s  of redundancy and redundancy management and on e a r l y  d e t e c t i o n  
of p o s s i b l e  sneak f a i l u r e  modes. References 1, 2 ,  and 3 a l l  provide  
u s e f u l  gu ides  f o r  f a i l u r e  mode e f f e c t  a n a l y s i s .  
Laboratory s imula t ion  of f a i l u r e  modes t o  v e r i f y  e f f e c t s  and s e r v e  as 
an added guard a g a i n s t  sneak f a i l u r e  mode e f f e c t s .  
P i l o t e d  s imula to r  programs t o  measure p i l o t  r e a c t i o n  t o  f a i l u r e  modes 
where a p p l i c a b l e ,  under v a r i o u s  v i s i b i l i t y  and turbulence  cond i t ions .  
Adequate cons ide ra t ion  of wearout e f f e c t s  i n  mechanical /hydraul ic  
components. 
Q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  of system f a i l u r e  mode c r i t i c a l i t i e s  t o  p e r m i t  b e t t e r  
a l l o c a t i o n  of  e f f o r t  and redundancy. 
Adequate BITE t o  avoid  takeoff  w i th  p o s s i b l e  hidden f a i l u r e  modes. 
S u i t a b l e  p e r i o d i c  checks f o r  d e t e c t i o n  of p o s s i h l e  hidden f a i l u r e  modes 
n o t  f e a s i b l y  d e t e c t a b l e  by BITE.  
Proper  r e f l e c t i o n  of  p e r i o d i c  check i n t e r v a l  i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  p r e d i c t i o n s ,  
f o r  modes no t  d e t e c t e d  by BITE. 
Adequate BITE f a u l t  i s o l a t i o n  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  proper  s y s t e m  
r e p a i r .  
D e f i n i t i o n  o f  r e l i a b i l i t y  requirements  f o r  suppl ier-designed components 
i n  terms of f a i l u r e  mode e f f e c t s  and redundancy management as w e l l  as 
t h e  customary MTBF requi rements .  
e E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  s c h e d u l e  t h a t  p e r m i t s  adequate  r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t i n g  t o  
f i n d  areas f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  improvement a t  earliest p o s s i b l e  t i m e  b e f o r e  
f i n a l  d e s i g n  f r e e z e .  
e Vigorous f a i l u r e  a n a l y s i s  and r e l i a b i l i t y  c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  program, 
n o t  o n l y  i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  tests b u t  a l s o  i n  o t h e r  t e s t  areas ( q u a l i f i c a -  
t i o n ,  i r o n  b i r d ,  f l i g h t  tests, e t c . )  
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SAS MISSION RELIABILITY COMPARISONS 
BASIS: SAC AIR VEHICLE PERFORMANCE REPORTS, 1972 AND 1973 
ITEM 
FLIGHT RELIABILITY: 
PROBABILITY OF NO FLIGHT ABORT DUE TO SAS 
PROBABILITY OF NO SAS FLIGHT ABORT OR MAJOR 
DEGRADATION* IN FLIGHT 
DISPATCH R EL I A 61 L I TY : 
PROBABILITY OF NO LATE TAKEOFF OR CANCELLATION 
DUE TO SAS 
COMBINED RELlABl LlTY: 
PROBABILITY OF NO SAS FLIGHT ABORT, MAJOR 
DEGRADATION, LATE TAKEOFF, OR CANCELLATION 











PREDICTION (NO WEAROUT) 
PREDICTION (WITH WEAROUT) 
EXPERIENCE TO DATE 
SAS FLIGHT SAFETY RELIABILITY 
FLIGHT SAFETY 
R EL I AB1 L I TY 
AIRCRAFT LOSS RATE DUE 




N O  LOSSES NO LOSSES 
778 
